Thomson, J.J. (1971)  “A defense of abortion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, 47 - 66.

Thomson’s  position.   Fetus may or may not have right to life, but either way some abortions are permissible.

 

Principle:   General:  Rights of individuals.  Specific.  Rights over own body.

 

Method:  Analogy with imaginary cases.  Intuitions about those cases. (So if you do not agree with the intuition, you will not accept the argument.)

 

The Violinist analogy (part one).

 

A violinist is ill.  He will die if he is not connected to another person so that he can use that person’s kidneys.  He will need this service for thee months.

 

You are kidnapped by music lovers and connected to a violinist so that he can use your kidneys. 

He will need to be connected to you for nine months. 

He did not choose to be connected to you.

He will die if you disconnect.

 

The violinist has a right to life.

The violinist is innocent, in the sense that he did not choose or impose the situation.

Separation will kill him.

 

THOMSON says - it is morally permissible to disconnect.   You did not consent to the relationship, so the relationship is unjust.

 

Conclusion: Right to life does not imply right to use of your body without your consent.

 

Pregnancy due to rape is an unjust situation.  By parity of reasoning, the foetus may have a right to life, but that does not give it right to use of your body.  Therefore in this case abortion is permissible.

 

The Violinist analogy (part two).

 

Same as in part one, but you will die from the strain on your kidneys .

 

THOMSON says:  Your right to life gives you the right to disconnect yourself. 

 

Conclusion:  If the pregnancy  threatens the woman’s life, then she has the right to terminate.  Abortion is permissible.

(Note:  But what if the pregnancy were voluntary?)

 

The enormous child analogy.

You and a child are inside a very small house.   Neither you nor the child can leave the house.  The child  is growing very rapidly, and soon he will be so big that he will crush you.   The child has no evil intent, and cannot restrain its growth.    In that sense the child is “innocent”. 

 

Thomson says your right to life makes it a morally permissible to kill the child to save your own life.  (It is also morally permissible for you to allow the child to crush you and kill you.)

 

Conclusion:   it is sometimes morally permissible to directly kill an “innocent” person.    In an analogous way, when the growth of the foetus is a threat to the woman’s life, directly killing a foetus is morally permissible. 

 

(This means the view that abortion is never morally permissible is wrong.)

 

The overcoat analogy.

Jones steals Smith’s coat and puts it on.  Without his coat smith will freeze to death.  Without Smith’s coat, Jones will freeze to death.

Thomson says Smith has a right to take his coat back, even though Jones will die as a result.  Also, it is morally permissible for a third party to take the coat from Jones and give it back to Smith. 

 

Conclusion: When it is morally permissible for a woman to have an abortion, it is morally permissible to provide abortion service. 

 

The right to life issue.

 

Thomson regards the concept of the right to life as being the most important issue in the debate, and uses this analogy to examine the idea .   She gives three versions of the right to life.

 

Limited:  right to life gives the right to “the bare minimum” need to continue living.

 

More limited:  right to life gives the right not to be killed by anyone.

 

Most limited:  right to life is a right not to be killed unjustly

 

Peter Fonda’s touch.

You are about to die.  If Peter Fonda touches you, you will be cured.

 

(a)  Peter Fonda is far away.

(b)  Peter Fonda is just outside the room.

 

Thomson says in case a it is not wrong for Fonda to refuse to travel and heal you.  In case b it would be horribly wrong to refuse.

 

Why are cases a and b different?  It can’t be just a matter of distance. 

 

If we interpret right to life in the limited way, you have a right to have Fonda travel across the country and touch you.  It would be wrong for him to refuse.

 

If we interpret right to life in the most limited way, you do not have a right to Fonda’s touch .  It would not be wrong for him to refuse to travel.

 

But why, then, would it be wrong for him to refuse to help in case b?

 

Thomson suggests that there is morality beyond rights.  She appeals to a concept of  obligatory personal sacrifice she refers to as Minimal Decency.

 

The Chocolates.

Case a.

Two brothers are jointly given a box of chocolates.

Each brother has a right to half the chocs.

One brother refuses to share. 

Therefore: his action is unjust.  (A right is being violated.)

 

Case b.

One of two brothers is given a box of chocolates.

Only he has a right to the chocs.

He refuses to share. 

Therefore: his action is not unjust.  (No right is being violated.)

 

But

Moral principle:  sharing when we can is good.

Therefore: he still ought to share

 

Minimal Decency requires Fonda to help in case b.  It does not demand so large a sacrifice as would be required in case a.

Minimal Decency requires you to stay attached to the violinist for one hour, if that were all that is required, but not the whole nine months.

 

Minimal Decency  applies to abortion when

(a) the pregnancy has already progressed , and

(b) the woman cannot justify the abortion by appeal to rights (e.g., the pregnancy would not endanger her life or health) .

 

In such cases, MD requires continuing pregnancy.

 

 

The burglar.

(a)  You leave a window open at night.  A burglar comes in.  Do you bear any responsibility?

Can leaving the window open be counted as consent?  If yes, then consider case b.

(b) You install steel bars across the windows.  Yu leave a window open at night.  A burglar cuts through the bars and comes in.   Do you bear any responsibility?

Thomson says “No.” The function of the bars is to prevent entry, so in this case it is difficult to suggest any consent even though you know that it is possible for a well-equipped burglar to cut through them.

 

(c)   Suppose people grow from seeds that drift around on the wind.  You put expensive seed-screens over your windows.   Even so, a few seeds drift in and grow.  Do you bear any responsibility?

Thomson says “No” again.  You have taken reasonable precautions.

 

Conclusion:  There are reasonable precautions against pregnancy.  If one becomes pregnant despite taking these precautions, one has not  consented to the pregnancy.

 

Proposed principle.  Foetus only has a right to use woman’s body if that woman

(a) voluntarily consented to the act which resulted in the pregnancy,

and

 (b) did so in full knowledge of the chance of pregnancy.